jhk87 said:I am - I began by looking through some TAMs and then referenced the PAM (1996 version - it's all I have in PDF at the moment). My fault; will give myself 15 mins mark time. Also looked through course notes which were very big on control measures.
The German offensives began with no appreciable political or operational aim and the lack of higher co-ordination made it very difficult to really find a purpose for them. In the end, they burnt out their most aggressive troops in the matter of a couple of months.
Are you saying that Mission Command is over-rated or that it is not practiced? I don't see the linkage between mission command and higher assets.
I'm not saying that Mission Command is a bad idea, I'm saying that it has to be one idea among many to make for effective operations. Once a term begins getting bandied about the army, it quickly has its context lost in the rush to attach the buzzword to everything. Rather than training out "strategic" corporals to "think like generals," I would argue that we ought to make sure the role of the corporal is consistent with modern doctrine and then train our corporals to be good corporals, just like we should should train our subalterns to be good subalterns, and generals generals.
See? My argument has been synergised!
Mission-type orders are nothing new, nor are they the be-all, end-all. I would make the argument that while initiative is vital, having assets that the bn and coy level is also key. As of now' they're lacking - mobility and indirect fire can only really be gained through the bde level and the removal of the AA Pl at bn level means that all Pl comds have to rely on the availiablity of tanks, which we nearly scrapped. Mission-type orders ultimately create opportunities for exploitation, but, if these opportunities have no means of being reinforced, then there's virtually no point. Without dets of 81mm, AA or pioneers, how can the OC really influence the battle without getting his fingers the pl attacks?