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Found a few good articles in a recent edition of the US Army's Infantry Journal. One was a montage of tactical scenarios from the NTC written by two OCTs. You can find it here:
http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2017/APR-JUN/pdf/INFMAG_APR-JUN17.pdf
I've included an excerpt encompassing one of the scenarios. It demonstrates the value of good force-on-force training:
I was fortunate enough to have my platoon destroyed in a scenario like this in Wainwright during a Maple Guardian scenario. Fortunate because you really do learn from losing hard. Our combat team suffered from the same problems - a feeling of invulnerability led us to charge through a defile of broken terrain surrounded by high ground in anticipation of quickly closing with an enemy in a village. Instead, we were hammered in and on the exit of the defile. This is basic security, and yet I've seen more than one instance of it being poorly understood/executed by commanders.
1. Note the importance of the map recce and identifying probable contact points prior to stepping off. A commander should be able to do this from his turret in a pinch if he has to. This is good "snap training" a leader can conduct with his/her subordinates in a pinch with a map. This wasn't done because the commander being training situated his estimate - he assumed the enemy would be sitting on the other side of the defile and built his plan around that situated estimate.
2. Note the organization for the advance. The US uses a system of "reconnaissance element/forward security element (FSE)/advance guard (AG)." Canadian doctrine has a similar doctrinal concept, except that the wording is a bit muddled (there is contradiction between terminology due to an incomplete revision). 321-005 (BG in Ops) terms it a covering force and the advance guard (with vanguard (= US FSE) and main guard (= US AG)). I think the term "covering force" for the reconnaissance element is fundamentally wrong (despite the reason given at page 9-10 of 321-005), as a reconnaissance element and a covering force have two doctrinally different missions. In fact, the entire Recce Element/Vanguard/Main Guard should be termed "the covering force" for an advancing element. This should look familiar to anyone who has grappled with a Soviet/Russian/Red Force element in an exercise, as the Recce/Forward Security/Vanguard was SOP for their mechanized advance.
3. Notice the importance of getting out your scouts/infantrymen at the appropriate time to secure high ground and assist in mounted reconnaissance. For some reason, some mechanized commanders are reluctant to do this, and I've seen it lead to inflated (simulated) casualties on exercise as soldiers are killed/wounded while riding in the back of vehicles.
4. This security principle, although focused on a mechanized force, is also applicable to a light force. A light battalion, advancing through the mountains or jungle or where ever, should employ its reconnaissance platoon and a rifle company (with support) as a covering force consisting of a recce element, a vanguard, and a main guard.
5. Force on force is the only way to bring these lessons out. Figure 11s in a live fire environment would simply give the commander being trained the opportunity to dismount and start shooting. Force on force is the peak of the training pyramid, hands down.
6. This scenario also highlights the value of "training to failure." Similar to my experience, I'm sure the commander in the above anecdote will never wish away security again. It is probably important that every maneuver commander be exposed to a scenario like this during their command tenure to feel what it's like if they don't employ enough security on the move.
http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2017/APR-JUN/pdf/INFMAG_APR-JUN17.pdf
I've included an excerpt encompassing one of the scenarios. It demonstrates the value of good force-on-force training:
Ambush at Bravo Pass
The lead element of the Stryker infantry battalion, the task force scouts, moved north mounted on its Strykers through the tight mobility corridor commonly referred to as “The Passage to India” or “PTI.” They had not made direct-fire contact yet. If all went according to the plan, they would move north through the PTI and then turn west through Bravo Pass into Echo Valley. Once in Echo Valley, they would continue moving northwest toward the FSS Gap where the battalion would destroy a defending enemy mechanized infantry company. All was going well so far. In fact, it was eerily quiet. Why hadn’t they at least received some enemy indirect fires? The lead Stryker Reconnaissance Vehicle (RV) reported over the battalion’s operations and intelligence (O&I) net that there was a mine-wire obstacle crossing Bravo Pass. Before the S2 could reply, the trail vehicle of the scout platoon was destroyed by an enemy AT-13. They were trapped! All four of the platoon’s vehicles were stacked on top of each other in a column formation with less than 50 meters between each RV. The lead vehicle was immobilized by the obstacle, and the trail vehicle was a burning hulk. Bravo Company, also moving in a tight column, approached behind the scout platoon. In less than five minutes its lead, fifth, and tenth ICVs were also destroyed by AT-5 fires. It was almost as if the AT-5 gunner was picking every fourth vehicle after the lead ICV to engage. To compound matters, the destruction included the catastrophic loss of two rifle squads, a weapons squad, two Javelins, and two M240B machine guns. A platoon was gone just like that. The remainder of Bravo Company’s Infantrymen dismounted from their ICVs. The cold realization set in that they were in the middle of an L-shaped ambush.
An understrength enemy infantry platoon was positioned on the northern wall of Bravo Pass. They were the ones who destroyed the scout RVs with AT-13 fires. With the lead vehicle trapped against the obstacle and the trail vehicle destroyed, it was just a matter of time before they finished off the remainder of the scouts. Meanwhile, a pair of enemy BRDM-2s with AT-5s was positioned approximately three kilometers to the northeast. They had let the scout RVs pass by without a sound, and then they began picking off the Bravo Company ICVs starting with the lead vehicle and then working on every fourth vehicle afterwards. They didn’t have to traverse their sights very far from one ICV to the next. Similar to the scouts, Bravo Company had been traveling in column with only 50 meters separation between vehicles. Despite the complex, canalizing terrain, Bravo Company had not dismounted its Infantrymen. The company thought it had a free ride through the passes and that the scouts would provide them advanced warning of any pending attack. Unfortunately, they had closed to within 200 meters of the trail scout vehicle so by default the scouts were no longer a forward reconnaissance element. They were now “canaries” falling by the wayside, providing only a few precious seconds of advanced warning of the impending disaster. While the Bravo Company’s Infantrymen poured out of their remaining ICVs and attempted to locate the direction of the ambush, the battalion mortars went into action. The task force commander knew he had to get some suppression and obscuration between his column and the enemy defending the obstacle in Bravo Pass. Although they did not score any enemy battle damage, the mortars did provide effective suppressive effects and obscuration. The enemy’s dismounted AT-13 gunners had to preposition, and the obscuration allowed the sappers from the attached engineer platoon to move forward to the obstacle.
They were efficient breaching the mine-wire obstacle and within 15 minutes reported having a lane created. Through all of the excitement of breaching the obstacle while in direct-fire contact, they didn’t notice that 800 meters to their west an enemy Family of Scatterable Mines (FASCAM) minefield was being deployed to reconstitute the blocking effect in the pass. Charlie Company didn’t notice either and blindly drove through the breach lane into the FASCAM. In less than two minutes, nine ICVs with accompanying rifle and weapons squads were all destroyed. The company was combat ineffective. The Bravo Company Infantrymen were still alive, but almost all of their ICVs were destroyed from the deadly BRDMs patrolling to their northeast. They still did not know where the enemy soldiers were because they continued to mill about in the low canalizing terrain. If they had simply moved up to the high ground dominating the pass complex, they would have seen the horror that was materializing still further to their northeast. Beyond the two AT-5 BRDMs, which were now black on ammunition after emptying their rounds into Bravo Company, was an enemy motorized infantry company (MIC). It was not just any MIC, but the very one the company had hoped to attack in the FSS Gap. Now it was moving southeast down the Silver Lakes Main Supply Route (MSR) at a high rate of speed. They circled out of sight like a curious shark before turning back to the southwest and then subsequently attacking into the rear of the battalion column. Fortunately, Alpha Company, informed of the fates of the other companies, had dismounted its Infantrymen and was able to position a couple of Javelins to destroy a platoon’s worth of enemy fighting vehicles, taking the momentum out of the enemy’s attack.
Observations — Units must be in a fighting formation before they make direct-fire contact. This process starts during mission analysis with the identification of key terrain dominating complex, canalizing mobility corridors. In this case the rotational unit did not identify the terrain at higher elevations dominating PTI and Bravo Pass as being key terrain. Had they done so, they likely would have concluded that there was a distinct possibility of making contact with the enemy in either of these two locations. Identification of this probable line of contact (PLC) should have led to development of a probable line of deployment (PLD). This PLD should have served as a trigger for the task force scouts to utilize key terrain at higher elevations to gain a better vantage point to identify enemy forces in these two adjoining passes. Had they simply dismounted to the hills on either flank of the PTI, they would have detected both the enemy infantry force on the north wall of Bravo Pass as well as the two AT-5 BRDMs located further northeast of the passes. Instead, they traveled mounted in the canalizing terrain at low elevation and were destroyed in detail. Conducting time/distance analysis of the terrain to be traversed should have also shaped planning for reconnaissance in depth. Identification of the aforementioned PLD and corresponding requirement to dismount scouts to observe the far side of the passes should have resulted in a corresponding estimate of time required to conduct reconnaissance forward of the task force main body. This did not occur, and the next company in the order of movement traveled on the heels of the scouts. The scouts now could not realistically provide the next rifle company any advance warning of enemy contact, and the lead rifle company compounded a bad situation by continuing to move into the kill sack of the enemy’s ambush.
If a unit does not have shared understanding of the enemy’s disposition, then this situation mandates that the unit utilize a movement-to-contact method of attack. This means that the battalion should have a reconnaissance element to find the enemy, a platoon-sized maneuver element to act as a forward security element (FSE), and a company minus-sized element (usually the parent company of the FSE platoon) to act as the battalion’s advance guard (AG). The battalion’s two remaining companies should be echeloned to the right and left rear respectively of the AG, creating a battalion task force wedge formation capable of reacting to enemy direct fire contact in almost any direction. The FSE is tasked with destroying the lead enemy platoon it comes into contact with and subsequently fixing the next enemy force it comes into contact with. The AG is tasked with destroying remnants of the force fixed by the FSE and subsequently fixing the next follow-on enemy force it comes in contact with. This allows the battalion commander to develop the situation and determine how to best maneuver his remaining two companies. Stryker infantry units should ensure that they dismount their Infantrymen prior to making direct-fire contact with enemy antitank systems. Units that achieve mutual, symbiotic support between ICVs and maneuvering rifle squads are most lethal. In order to accomplish this, the unit must identify PLCs (as discussed previously) to determine PLDs triggering the dismounting of Infantry forces at either an objective rally point (ORP) or assault position.
In this case, the scout platoon and Bravo Company failed to perform their duties related to reconnaissance, the FSE, and the AG respectively. However, the rapid destruction of these units necessitated a reconstitution of the FSE-AG movement-to-contact formation. The next company in the order of movement should have assumed duties as the reconnaissance-FSE-AG formation and dismounted its infantry to key terrain at higher elevation to first find the enemy in question. Then they could have subsequently fixed and destroyed the relatively small enemy force in Bravo Pass. This action in turn would have provided the battalion commander with additional time to further develop the situation and determine his next best course of action. In this case, the remaining Infantry companies were content to remain in the lower canalizing terrain which prevented them from gaining awareness about the evolving enemy situation. They spent the remainder of this battle reacting to enemy contact instead of moving to key terrain in an effort to wrestle initiative away from a relatively small enemy force.
I was fortunate enough to have my platoon destroyed in a scenario like this in Wainwright during a Maple Guardian scenario. Fortunate because you really do learn from losing hard. Our combat team suffered from the same problems - a feeling of invulnerability led us to charge through a defile of broken terrain surrounded by high ground in anticipation of quickly closing with an enemy in a village. Instead, we were hammered in and on the exit of the defile. This is basic security, and yet I've seen more than one instance of it being poorly understood/executed by commanders.
1. Note the importance of the map recce and identifying probable contact points prior to stepping off. A commander should be able to do this from his turret in a pinch if he has to. This is good "snap training" a leader can conduct with his/her subordinates in a pinch with a map. This wasn't done because the commander being training situated his estimate - he assumed the enemy would be sitting on the other side of the defile and built his plan around that situated estimate.
2. Note the organization for the advance. The US uses a system of "reconnaissance element/forward security element (FSE)/advance guard (AG)." Canadian doctrine has a similar doctrinal concept, except that the wording is a bit muddled (there is contradiction between terminology due to an incomplete revision). 321-005 (BG in Ops) terms it a covering force and the advance guard (with vanguard (= US FSE) and main guard (= US AG)). I think the term "covering force" for the reconnaissance element is fundamentally wrong (despite the reason given at page 9-10 of 321-005), as a reconnaissance element and a covering force have two doctrinally different missions. In fact, the entire Recce Element/Vanguard/Main Guard should be termed "the covering force" for an advancing element. This should look familiar to anyone who has grappled with a Soviet/Russian/Red Force element in an exercise, as the Recce/Forward Security/Vanguard was SOP for their mechanized advance.
3. Notice the importance of getting out your scouts/infantrymen at the appropriate time to secure high ground and assist in mounted reconnaissance. For some reason, some mechanized commanders are reluctant to do this, and I've seen it lead to inflated (simulated) casualties on exercise as soldiers are killed/wounded while riding in the back of vehicles.
4. This security principle, although focused on a mechanized force, is also applicable to a light force. A light battalion, advancing through the mountains or jungle or where ever, should employ its reconnaissance platoon and a rifle company (with support) as a covering force consisting of a recce element, a vanguard, and a main guard.
5. Force on force is the only way to bring these lessons out. Figure 11s in a live fire environment would simply give the commander being trained the opportunity to dismount and start shooting. Force on force is the peak of the training pyramid, hands down.
6. This scenario also highlights the value of "training to failure." Similar to my experience, I'm sure the commander in the above anecdote will never wish away security again. It is probably important that every maneuver commander be exposed to a scenario like this during their command tenure to feel what it's like if they don't employ enough security on the move.