DND may be shopping for new subs, sources say

[Ex-Dragoon]

You could probably use a small freighter modifed to be a sub tender but doing so we would be one of the few nations to do so. The worlds navies seem to be getting out of the tender business.

 

[CougarKing]

ExDragoon and Drunknsubmariner,

Thanks for the replies.

 

[STONEY]

Everyone seems to forget the Japanese, they have large long range diesel boats with the latest technology & sensors including AIP in the latest versions.  Yes i realize they never export but they still exist.

Cheers

 

[drunknsubmrnr]

The Japanese build pretty large boats, and they should be long-ranged according to the size. But when's the last time you saw one deploy out of the local Japanese area?

They might just be really good at staying covert, or they might not actually leave Japanese waters much.

 

[WPA]

WPA Really?
a) You do not use a glorified AOR as TG platform. We use destroyers because at least they can defend themselves to some degree. Using a frigate as a command and control platform is possible but its lacking in so many degrees and involves OPSEC so I will not mention them here.
b) Even with the new ESSM coming online, you are only extending the air defence so far (12-20 nm). Guess what sunshine, if you don't have a ship with Standards with you , you will not be able to take out the aircraft carrying those missiles that will blow your ships out of the water.

WPA I dare say you really don't understand naval warfare.

EX Dragoon thanks for your reply.
I never said i full understand naval warfare.

However i do understand  the optics of budgets, the taxpayers of Canada limit to defence spending and lack of ship building and time lines and equipment gaps.
Not to mention the sometimes the Military need for high end priced Bing Bing narrow view of military procurements and the politicans of the last 17 years messed thing up so bad that Canada has one of the worst records to new equipment procurement records for western countries.

What i proposed was a stop gap because Canada can not afford to bring the CF up to a creditable standard for at least 2 or 3 decades. The naval needs alone it too much. What about the other two branches.
The Current AAW would almost be useless and make no sense to refit do to age and cost and most likely out of service before the second JSS is completed. 

The JSS should be fitted with the L-band and APAR radar first designed for the Halifax frigate second batch that was to be ten meters larger to handle the upgrades planed now. However the Liberal gov. had no foresight  and got us in this mess.  The JSS is a big target in the first place. There for it should have the high level of defence area and Command and Control needed for the naval task force. The JSS should have 6 to 8 MK41 units built for the standard missile and the light with modern MK58 launch for the ESSM  the could be place more easily in different location on the ship. I hope that the MK58 would replace the Mk48 launchers on the HCFs. This would allow the the HCF to carry more ESSM in a smaller foot print in space and weight. The HCF will be able to do it job as sub hunter and task force escort ship at large area more effectively with the radar and missile loads on the JSS. 

Let face it. I would rather have a better mix of the different types of ship in the fleet but there needs to be a stop gap option while the naval force are being refit with a new AAW and frigates. I am sure the naval planners can work out the details better. The benefit of the stop gap options is that the naval force can study equipment and systems on Canadian ship for future designs of the new AAW and Frigates that meet Canada's needs.

However it looks to be that the shipbuilding is as follows:

3-4  JSS
HCF refit
AOPV
New Polar Heavy icebreaker
submarines
AAW
Frigates




     

     

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

EX Dragoon thanks for your reply.
I never said i full understand naval warfare.

However i do understand  the optics of budgets, the taxpayers of Canada limit to defence spending and lack of ship building and time lines and equipment gaps.
Not to mention the sometimes the Military need for high end priced Bing Bing narrow view of military procurements and the politicans of the last 17 years messed thing up so bad that Canada has one of the worst records to new equipment procurement records for western countries.

What i proposed was a stop gap because Canada can not afford to bring the CF up to a creditable standard for at least 2 or 3 decades. The naval needs alone it too much. What about the other two branches.
The Current AAW would almost be useless and make no sense to refit do to age and cost and most likely out of service before the second JSS is completed. 

The JSS should be fitted with the L-band and APAR radar first designed for the Halifax frigate second batch that was to be ten meters larger to handle the upgrades planed now. However the Liberal gov. had no foresight  and got us in this mess.  The JSS is a big target in the first place. There for it should have the high level of defence area and Command and Control needed for the naval task force. The JSS should have 6 to 8 MK41 units built for the standard missile and the light with modern MK58 launch for the ESSM  the could be place more easily in different location on the ship. I hope that the MK58 would replace the Mk48 launchers on the HCFs. This would allow the the HCF to carry more ESSM in a smaller foot print in space and weight. The HCF will be able to do it job as sub hunter and task force escort ship at large area more effectively with the radar and missile loads on the JSS. 

Let face it. I would rather have a better mix of the different types of ship in the fleet but there needs to be a stop gap option while the naval force are being refit with a new AAW and frigates. I am sure the naval planners can work out the details better. The benefit of the stop gap options is that the naval force can study equipment and systems on Canadian ship for future designs of the new AAW and Frigates that meet Canada's needs.

However it looks to be that the shipbuilding is as follows:

3-4  JSS
HCF refit
AOPV
New Polar Heavy icebreaker
submarines
AAW
Frigates

Sorry while I know your heart is in the right place, you just prove you need to do more research on all aspects of naval warfare.

You don't use your AOR as the primary air defence platform for your fleet, excuse my but I don't know a sailor that has a warm and comfy feeling being on a ship with all that fuel and ammo being able to fire SM2s and ESSMs. CIWS, Goalkeeper all is good. RAM maybe. So much can go wrong with missiles though its scary.

You decide to not give the fleet an AAW capability and you lose it. We did not have a submarine capability for less then a decade and we lost so much, that we will be playing catch up for the next dozen years. You start taking away key capabilities like AAW, ASW and ASuW away and in on seruiousness we may as well remain tied up because we are not doing the military any favours, nor our allies and most important of all the Canadian people.

 

[WPA]

Sorry while I know your heart is in the right place, you just prove you need to do more research on all aspects of naval warfare.

You don't use your AOR as the primary air defence platform for your fleet, excuse my but I don't know a sailor that has a warm and comfy feeling being on a ship with all that fuel and ammo being able to fire SM2s and ESSMs. CIWS, Goalkeeper all is good. RAM maybe. So much can go wrong with missiles though its scary.

You decide to not give the fleet an AAW capability and you lose it. We did not have a submarine capability for less then a decade and we lost so much, that we will be playing catch up for the next dozen years. You start taking away key capabilities like AAW, ASW and ASuW away and in on seruiousness we may as well remain tied up because we are not doing the military any favours, nor our allies and most important of all the Canadian people.

Thank you your reply as you patient in your responses.

As i said i would rather have a new AAW ship built before the old one are gone and give the fleet an AAW capability.
However, what is done is done. The problem is the age of the old ship and lack of fore sight of the Liberal Gov. (90's) did not move ahead with the larger version of the HCF or begin the new design work on a AAW ship.
Then what, you will still loose the skill. with out a new AAW ship.
What do you do ?

The JSS proposal as i said was a stop gap move so the navy does not lose the key AAW capability and the ASW and ASuW capability is maintained by HCF.
The JSS is going to be 28000 to 30000 tons a ship of this size you will be able to in install Mk41 or the new MK57 (DDX) and Mk58 for ESSM safely on the top of the fore structure. Other ship have installed the launchers.
The us design the LPD 17 to have a MK41 launcher in stalled and the ship large loads of fuel, missile, munition of all sizes on the same ship.

The other proposal that some navies have done is  do major fit with adding a hull section and redesign of the fore structure for the radar and missile launcher.
The problem is the expansive to do an will have unforeseen problem. Hull 5,8,9,10 should be used as this a the younger hulls in the fleet and would make it reasonable for the conversion while the other ship go through the regular refit program.

This would get use the AAW ship fast then a new build. it also reduce the fleet size. this migh not be a bad thing if the reports are true that there are manning problem already.

Is there any other solution that out there that is sell able to the Gov and the Taxpayers?   

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Again the JSS is a purpose built AOR the San Antonio has fuel for its Air Group vehicles and itself. Have you ever taken a tour abord any AOR to get an idea what kind of spaces you are talking about for refuelling.

You do realize the JSS will be fitted with navigational radars. To be an AAW platform you need specialized Air Search radars and that changes things such as top weight. As was said in another post AAW plaforms are built around the sensors and the launchers.

Psst btw we refer to the Halifax class as the CPF, your using the HCF is confusing to some.

 

[a_majoor]

This project seems to have gone off the rails somewhere, but perhaps there is potential in these ideas:

http://www.military.com/Opinions/1,14790,Buff_090705-P2,00.html

In late autumn 2004, the U.S. Navy and DARPA jointly announced a new submarine design feasibility study, TANGO BRAVO. The name derives from the initials T and B, standing for “Technology Barriers” (or more optimistically, “Technology Breakthroughs.”) That initial announcement was met with a mix of enthusiasm, skepticism, and confusion, depending on who you were and whom you listened to back then.

Well, enough time has passed for some dust to have settled, some multi-million-dollar contracts to have been awarded, and some clarity in general to have emerged. As stated rather emphatically by senior Navy officers who are now overseeing and managing the project, TANGO BRAVO is not the design of a new class of super-submarine. Rather, the effort consists of a cluster of interrelated feasibility studies, looking “outside the box” at many different aspects of fast-attack sub layout, arming, and manning. There's no guarantee that any particular one of these innovative concept thrusts will pan out in practice, and the timeframe for any payoff -- in terms of new subs actually in commission, in the water -- may be better measured in decades than in years. But this is definitely not bad news: It's simply a reality check on public expectations.

The driving force behind TANGO BRAVO can be summarized in one word, cost. The latest class of fast-attack sub (SSN), the Virginias, at the present funded building rate of one a year have a price tag around 2.5 billion dollars each. Some experts believe that if this building rate could be doubled, to (say) one Virginia per year by General Dynamics Electric Boat, and one by Northrop Grumman Newport News Shipbuilding (who now share the work on each sub in a complicated teaming arrangement), the cost per boat would drop to around $2 billion each. That's still a lot of money, though arguably it's reasonable for what the Navy and America get in undersea peacekeeping and combat power -- the Virginias are truly superb 21st century capital ships.

But here's where the problem of fleet size comes in, driven by the problem of cost: A modern SSN has a useful hull life of about 33 years. Building at the rate of one a year, eventually the fast-attack component of our Submarine Force would reach a steady state of 33 vessels. By the 2020s, however, China alone could outnumber us with nuclear-powered and diesel subs together by a factor of five, maybe more. That puts us at the danger point where the advantage tilts from individual quality to sheer quantity, especially in enemy home waters -- i.e., WESTPAC.

If we could build more than one good or great SSN for the same money that currently pays for just one Virginia, our Navy and our country would be better prepared for whatever challenges the future holds. One conceivable way to get a cheaper but capable SSN is to perfect innovative means to make it smaller without sacrificing performance, and perhaps even while enhancing performance. Hence the bold push named TANGO BRAVO.

TANGO BRAVO feasibility studies are looking at five main areas of technology, every one of which contributes significantly to SSN cost over a sub's useful lifespan, and every one of which could produce very valuable breakthroughs -- genuine upside discontinuities -- in what next-generation American SSNs look like and how they work. It's way too soon to know for sure how much each of these different directions of exploration and experimentation will pan out productively. Tradeoffs will have to be made, and competing new design options will lead to winners and losers in the always-brutal Beltway acquisition game. Above all, there's the chance of technology failure. Some ideas that sound wonderful today or next year may prove to be too expensive or even infeasible in practice. Enticing artists' conceptions of futuristic-looking fast attacks in magazines or brochures are merely that -- artists' conceptions. And implementation of any new prototype models or production designs will be subject to the same familiar bugaboos as ever: deadline delays and budget overruns. (The Virginias, originally, were supposed to go for something like only half their current price in constant dollars. The UK's new Astute-class SSN has suffered nearly crippling delays and overruns due to an atrophying design and engineering expertise base -- a cautionary tale for the U.S.)
So a bit of healthy disbelief seems advised when TANGO BRAVO's goal is labeled as “the same or better mission capabilities for half the money,” or claims are made that “with concerted effort, an SSN design derived from TANGO BRAVO would be ready for procurement in 2011 or -- under ideal conditions -- even earlier.” On the other hand, we can't afford to not do TANGO BRAVO, or our own expertise base will wither irrecoverably, and we won't have a good follow-on class beyond the Virginias.

These are the five main technology areas encompassed in legislation and contract language for TANGO BRAVO:

1. Shaftless propulsion. The propulsion shaft of current SSN designs is long and rather heavy, causing center-of-gravity (trim) difficulties for naval architects, and the shaft requires a large hole in the stern of the pressure hull. Moving to all-electric propulsion, with the drive motors encased in pods outside the people tank, and with hull penetrations needed only for power cables that don't rotate, is a very attractive alternative. A word of devil's advocacy, though. A commercial ship with a similar arrangement recently suffered a serious fire in one such pod; no one was injured, but the ship was crippled. And this was on the surface with help nearby -- not deeply submerged during battle maneuvers. The tech for submarine use will surely get there, but the point is it isn't there yet and it won't be cheap.

2. External weapons stowage. Right now, a lot of pressure-hull volume is taken up by an SSN's torpedo room, including its weapon-handling machinery and the torpedo tubes themselves. Were weapons to be carried outside the hull, the ship could prove to be smaller and cheaper. In fact a greater number of bigger weapons might be deployable on a submarine significantly smaller than today's available SSN classes. If it works, it's a major gain for American taxpayers. But once more, just for argument's sake, let me play devil's advocate. If weapons are stored outside the hull, several new requirements arise. The weapons have to be protected from ambient sea pressure until ready to fire, because riding around for months on end at tens of atmospheres, down deep in corrosive salt water, is more than an Improved Mark 48 ADCAP torpedo or Tactical Tomahawk cruise missile is meant to bear. The weapons, whatever their physical arrangement, need to be enclosed in a streamlined casing of some sort, or else they'd create severe hydrodynamic drag and “singing” that would emit a telltale -- noisy -- acoustic signature and also reduce the ship's maximum speed. (Are we moving toward a double-hull design like long-standing Russian/Soviet practice? If so, are our cost savings quickly evaporating?) Lastly, even if the weapon-rounds themselves are “wooden,” i.e., meant to be free from any maintenance while on board, the hookups for data links and other required preambles to firing, plus the entire complicated firing mechanism itself, could create fatal problems in case of any malfunction that occurs outside the main hull. Today, at least, all these numerous items required to put torpedoes on target, and the supporting equipment that comes with each Tomahawk vertical launch system tube, are accessible to men in the torpedo room in a shirtsleeves environment.

3. Hull adaptable sonar array. This is a very promising area, since at present an SSN is equipped with several different sonar complexes each of which makes for awkwardness in ship equipment layout, and also in sonar blind spots. As just one example, the sonar dome within the soft nose of current SSNs makes the bow extremely vulnerable in case of collision or battle damage. (See photos released by the Navy of USS San Francisco's sonar dome while in dry dock after she hit an uncharted seamount.) If sensors could be integrated directly with high-yield steel, all around an SSN's hull, designers would have important new flexibility.

4. Ship infrastructure reduction. At present, different auxiliary sub-systems in an SSN are powered by electricity, hydraulics, compressed air, or other sources of energy. The result is a multitude of hardware throughout the internal compartments which calls for several distinct sets of maintenance skills, different stocks of spare parts, and different problems (and solutions) in case of a failure or a mishap. All-electric systems could greatly simplify this profusion of cables, pipes, valves, and operating machinery. The result could be a major saving in space (always at a premium in any submarine design), and in cost. However, traditionalists or conservative engineers and seasoned submariners might (rightly?) feel that using a single system to power every device aboard abandons redundancy and puts too many eggs in one basket.

5. Crew size reduction. From the Los Angeles class to the Seawolfs to the Virginias, crew size has dropped only slightly, remaining at well over one hundred men. There's a type of Catch-22 here, since the larger the crew, the more design weight, space, and cost must be allocated toward habitability. If automation could be significantly increased, crew size might substantially shrink -- and along with it, the size and cost of the ship. There's also a possible double-whammy benefit, as a smaller crew means not only a smaller, cheaper ship (provided automation is achieved at moderate unit expense), it means much lower lifetime charges for the entire fitted-out vessel as an integrated weapon system. This is because personnel themselves cost money, not only to train and nurture as they strive to earn their Dolphins and then climb their chosen career ladders, but also in terms of payroll, health benefits, dependent allowances, pension expenses, and so forth. A devil's advocate warning I've often heard from submariners is that over-automation could become an SSN's Achilles' heel. Scuttlebutt has it that newer data displays are non-ergonomic to the point of sometimes being distracting or overwhelming, as it is. When automation extends into the realm of artificial intelligence and expert systems for the control room, we're entering some pretty serious terra incognita. And when physical things break, it takes human experience, improvisation, and often brute strength to repair them. The human body itself is frail (think USS San Francisco again), so crew injuries are another deleterious factor that can't be ignored. If an SSN is too mechanized, and available manpower too small, that SSN may look like a terrific bargain on paper, but prove to be a dreadful flop at sea when it goes in harm's way. Between fixing damage, manually compensating for whatever things have been damaged until they're fixed, and treating wounded guys with healthy guys who can't do two things at once, there won't be adequate people to go around. Mission failures could result, presenting unacceptable threats to national security.

Nobody said TANGO BRAVO would be easy. This discussion can barely scratch the surface of a topic that will be worked on by some of our country's finest minds, and finest contractors and think tanks, for a long time to come. Hopefully readers have gained a sense of what TANGO BRAVO is so far, what it isn't, what it might be eventually, and what it can never be. By my own estimate, the first TANGO BRAVO submarine won't be built, shaken down, tuned up back in dry dock, and ready for battle before about 2022.

The one thing we do know, with the highest certainty, is that the TANGO BRAVO feasibility study has such a long-range payoff, in terms of practical undersea platforms in the water and passing stress tests, that the problem of the one-per-year Virginia build rate will haunt us constantly. Unless, that is, we wise up and allocate more money to build two Virginias per annum when Congress first has the option to do so for fiscal year 2007, rather than putting things off to FY 2012 or forever. In a report to Congress dated June 24, 2005, a TANGO BRAVO fast-attack was already being discussed as costing 75 percent as much as a Virginia. That's a heck of a lot of price creep from the 50 percent referred to barely six months earlier! How much further will this creeping go? When the day is done, will TANGO BRAVO cost savings turn out to be completely illusive, with all emphasis placed on the tech benefits, not the money?

Sea power is the key to global dominance, and to peace-enforcement on favorable terms. Undersea warfare is the key to modern sea power, especially when unmanned vehicles (submerged and airborne) enter the picture. There's a major backlog in SSN construction compared to even minimum national requirements -- our fast-attack fleet is too small and getting smaller, but the worst shortfall won't be manifest until 2015 or later, enabling dangerous complacency right now. If that backlog is allowed to grow, instead of being redressed with immediate urgency, America -- if only by default -- will take a big step toward becoming the latest former superpower.

 

[drunknsubmrnr]

Tango Bravo is still running, and they're having a lot of success in the external weapon stowage area.

TB is a follow-on to some things that came out of the "Forward PASS" and "Team 2020" projects. I was peripherally involved in Forward PASS while I worked in The Business.

 

[WPA]

Again the JSS is a purpose built AOR the San Antonio has fuel for its Air Group vehicles and itself. Have you ever taken a tour abord any AOR to get an idea what kind of spaces you are talking about for refuelling.

You do realize the JSS will be fitted with navigational radars. To be an AAW platform you need specialized Air Search radars and that changes things such as top weight. As was said in another post AAW plaforms are built around the sensors and the launchers.

Psst btw we refer to the Halifax class as the CPF, your using the HCF is confusing to some.

From everything i seen on the JSS would make it closer to the San Antonio than the old AOR that we have. It will have a large fuel tanks and ice harden hull which would more like make it more damage proof maybe?

The JSS will have a air wing of 3 to 4 copters
A command and control unit for land operation
1000 meter ro-on ro-off storage space for trucks, lavs,  tanks and etc.
A Hospital
accommodations for land forces

Like i said for a cost effect stop gap till we get new AWW ships there is no harm in adding a AAW and Task group command centre to the ship so we do not lose this capabilities.
I find hard that a 28000 pound ship,  not build yet would have a problem to have the APAR, L-band and missile launch add to be a top heavy weight problem.

The experience learn would benefit from this stop option would be used in the next AAW and CPF ships for Canada 

 

[drunknsubmrnr]

The LPD-17 has absolutely nothing to do with an AOR. Period. Our current AOR's and JSS have far more in common with each other than anything remotely resembling an LPD.

There's quite a bit of harm in adding AAW and command ship functionality to an AOR. For one thing, the AAW radars have a significant chance of spontaneously igniting fuel as it's passed during a RAS, assuming they don't simply microwave the RAS personnel first.

There's a lot more to adding AAW and command systems to a ship than just top weight. There's the structural aspects of a large empty missile launcher in your hull, the EMI aspects of the extra radars and antennae, and the power aspects of a greatly increased electrical requirements. What about cooling? What about fire-fighting? What about increased accomodations for all the new CSE techs and Naval Communicators?

Just trying to squeeze these in to a dedicated hull is hard enough. They tried hard with the TRUMPS but the ultimate product is not exactly ideal.

If we can't get new AAW ships, maybe we don't need them. In any case, we're going to have to learn to live without them. Probably the same for the new subs, to bring this back on topic.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

If we can't get new AAW ships, maybe we don't need them.

Hmmm, I fear that is what the Brits said just before the Falklands. But i do agree that "Multi-tasked" ships rarely achieve the abilities their planners dreamed up and generally at best do all of the jobs somewhat.

I can also see that our manning requirements are going to have to change, even at the expense of damage control and fire fighting.

 

[WPA]

The LPD-17 has absolutely nothing to do with an AOR. Period. Our current AOR's and JSS have far more in common with each other than anything remotely resembling an LPD.

There's quite a bit of harm in adding AAW and command ship functionality to an AOR. For one thing, the AAW radars have a significant chance of spontaneously igniting fuel as it's passed during a RAS, assuming they don't simply microwave the RAS personnel first.

There's a lot more to adding AAW and command systems to a ship than just top weight. There's the structural aspects of a large empty missile launcher in your hull, the EMI aspects of the extra radars and antennae, and the power aspects of a greatly increased electrical requirements. What about cooling? What about fire-fighting? What about increased accomodations for all the new CSE techs and Naval Communicators?

Just trying to squeeze these in to a dedicated hull is hard enough. They tried hard with the TRUMPS but the ultimate product is not exactly ideal.

If we can't get new AAW ships, maybe we don't need them. In any case, we're going to have to learn to live without them. Probably the same for the new subs, to bring this back on topic.

Let Face it

The JSS is part LDP, AOR and Icebreaker as one on the duties is to travel the north west passage to re enforce that It is Part of Canada and not an international shipping passage.

The JSS is also going to be used to resupply the new artic deep sea port and other bases and comunities.

Adding the AAW and task force functions for a Ship that need to do a speacial job only re enforce our claim of monitoring the north.

1)With the JSS that is still being selected for which company to do the final design and build the ships is actual the one of the best times to add the these function.

The JSS has the size and space to handle structural aspects of a large empty missile launcher in the hull, the EMI aspects of the extra radars and antennae, and the power aspects of a greatly increased electrical requirements. What about cooling? What about fire-fighting? What about increased accomodations for all the new CSE techs and Naval Communicators?

The JSS has plans for 1000 to 1500 meter sq lane space trucks, lavs, rg31 tanks etc could be reduce to 1000 meter and the rest for the needed changes to add the AAW and task force duties.
 

2)TRUMPS was project on ship that some say was not worth the upgrade and building the second batch of CPF large was the right course of action however the Liberials did not use and fore sight in ship building.
This is still a problem !

3) For example the large armoured missile section does not even have to be total flush mounted to the weather deck. Many Naval vesels have Mk41 launcher mounted above the weather deck built Germeny.
The design could create slope stowage comapartments around the luanchers for all docking, recue, safety, etc equipment and reduce the radar sect of the ship to be more stealthy.   

4)Canada is a nation with three large coast line. We need AAW, Frigates / Corverts, Subs, JSS, AOPV and Large heavy polar icebreaker. Everyone of these ships are important and Cand would just do a constant building program of 3 or 4 ships a year is very do able and affordable.   

 

[hugh19]

OK I think you should face it. YOU DO NOT READ or COMPREHEND, what you are being told


A resupply ship which is what the JSS is NOT  repeat NOT a LPD, or AAW ship. YOU do not once again repeat DO NOT use your tanker for all the other things you are talking about. They are not landing ships, they are to carry the armies equipment to a working port not land it amphibiously. The AAW ship has to do many things that inhibit its ability to do other tasks. Which I will not get into online.

I have never heard of a MK 41 being above deck. Please prove me wrong, but it is a inside ship system last time I checked. I work on a 280 so I have seen one up close. Adding more crap to the uppers is not a good way to increase stealthiness, but it is a great way to increase top weight.

Though I do agree that a ship building program of a few a year is the best way to go. But you need the political will for that.

 

[drunknsubmrnr]

Let Face it

The JSS is part LDP, AOR and Icebreaker as one on the duties is to travel the north west passage to re enforce that It is Part of Canada and not an international shipping passage.

How exactly is it going to do this? We send ships through the Strait of Juan de Fuca all the time, and it's still international as far as I know.

Adding the AAW and task force functions for a Ship that need to do a speacial job only re enforce our claim of monitoring the north.

How? 

1)With the JSS that is still being selected for which company to do the final design and build the ships is actual the one of the best times to add the these function.

Only if they're completely redesigned, setting the project back by years.

The JSS has the size and space to handle structural aspects of a large empty missile launcher in the hull, the EMI aspects of the extra radars and antennae, and the power aspects of a greatly increased electrical requirements.

Really? Very interesting. Are you sure about the EMI?

has plans for 1000 to 1500 meter sq lane space trucks, lavs, rg31 tanks etc could be reduce to 1000 meter and the rest for the needed changes to add the AAW and task force duties.

Also very interesting. Could you point out exactly how this could be done? 

2)TRUMPS was project on ship that some say was not worth the upgrade and building the second batch of CPF large was the right course of action however the Liberials did not use and fore sight in ship building.
This is still a problem !

I'm pretty sure the TRUMP and CPF programs lasted through both the Conservatives and Liberals. I don't see how the Liberals alone could be blamed for them.

3) For example the large armoured missile section does not even have to be total flush mounted to the weather deck. Many Naval vesels have Mk41 launcher mounted above the weather deck built Germeny.
The design could create slope stowage comapartments around the luanchers for all docking, recue, safety, etc equipment and reduce the radar sect of the ship to be more stealthy. 

All the Mk 41 manuals I've seen don't recommend that configuration. Are you quite sure of this?

 
4)Canada is a nation with three large coast line. We need AAW, Frigates / Corverts, Subs, JSS, AOPV and Large heavy polar icebreaker. Everyone of these ships are important and Cand would just do a constant building program of 3 or 4 ships a year is very do able and affordable.     

We need them, but I don't see any way we can afford them on the current budget.

 

[aussiechangover]

if Canada did get newer subs perhaps it would convince me to go back to the dark side, already qualified on Oberon and Collins class. although i do remember the problems we had when Collins was first introduced they were pieces of junk spent more time alongside than at sea completing trials just to get deep dive certificate.  haven't had much to do with the Canadian boats but i'm sure 2 different navies same issues from boats.

funniest thing i ever heard was the boss of ASC saying to the CO of Collins on it's first fast cruise "these things are supposed to go this deep right" which basically caused a look of fear in the control room.