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"Chariots on Fire" - IFV SOPs

Kirkhill

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The Merkava does one better, with an actual mortar. Not sure this is a viable option on a IFV though.


Cute. But isn't that just a low cost alternative to its main armament?

It is not going to be particularly effective against a squad in close, a fast moving ATGM or a Swarm. On the other hand they do have the Trophy system for that.

Can we combine something like Trophy with a small calibre, light weight RWS cheaply?
 

Kirkhill

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Interesting. And that's a new one on me albeit that Northrup got a development contract for it a couple of years ago. I haven't seen much on it but did dig up this test video.


Clearly a different solution if it uses a true proximity fuze but equally effective.

I expect it has the same issue as MANTIS in that it needs a complex sensor system with a data link to get the gun onto a predicted target location. I note the video was posted Feb 22, 2022 (although I think it might have come out at their 2021 Bushmaster Users' conference) so am somewhat surprised at the how experimental it still looks.

🍻

And interestingly enough, not an AFV, IFV or APC in sight.
 

Infanteer

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Fair comment. But if infiltration was possible in the well defined linear front of WWI and the more amorphous fronts of WWII then it is at least as easy to "get to" the assets in the "rear" now as it was then.

We seem to spend a lot of time considering the assault and protecting the assaulters. We seem to spend less time considering the requirements of the defence. The first thing that draws my eye is that while it may be true that "he who defends everything holds nothing" it seems to be equally true that he who defends most wins. Fortunately, the defender still has many advantages, some of which play to the benefits of industrialization, automation and "low-skilled" operators.

Assaulters are in a different league.

Yes, but in the context of this thread, on the defence the infantry should be dismounted anyways, so the topic at hand isn't really an issue.
 

Kirkhill

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Yes, but in the context of this thread, on the defence the infantry should be dismounted anyways, so the topic at hand isn't really an issue.

But how much preparation do you have to prepare a hasty defence, or for that matter a hasty attack? At what point do you sense a change in the situation that suggests the change from a mounted course of action to a dismounted course of action?

Do you want to make good time and accept risks?
Or do you want to minimize risks and accept a slow pace?
Are you going to push out advance, rear and flank guards and adjust to the terrain or highball it down the middle of the road?


Other examples?
Column moving widely spaced on a two lane highway in open fields with hedgerows being plinked apart with precision.
Vehicles bunched up for a river crossing.
Generals being chased out of HQs by artillery raids.
Helicopters and Generals being destroyed by 20 strikes on the same parking lot.
Batteries being forced to disperse into two gun sections because 6 gun batteries are too tempting a target?

I seems to me the TAPV with RWS and 4 dismounts - 4 to 6 of them to every company/battery in the field would make a useful security det. In other words every company or battery - guns, rockets or AD, trucks, helos, maintenance or command, should have its own, or should be able to field its own, "infantry/CRAM" platoon to be able to protect the sub-unit while on the move and also, while static and performing its primary function.

Lots of opportunities for Reserve Infantry and Cavalry tasks - VP defence and LOC security. Lots of reasons for all arms to maintain General Duties soldiers on their rolls. Soldiers that can be learning their primary trade at the same time they are providing security.

Or do we anticipate drawing Chariots of Fire, with their assaulters, from the assault force to disperse around the rear as security forces?

It seems to me that if the Chariot is primarily intended to be an Assault vehicle then that will demand one set of characteristicss On the other hand a General Duties/Utility/Security vehicle will have different needs. I doubt we can afford to use assault vehicles throughout the entire rear area and if we try we would end up with one vehicle that is a less than ideal assault vehicle and both too few in number and too expensive, not to mention over equipped to be a utility vehicle.

Perhaps something like this for the rear security vehicle instead of, or in addition to, the TAPV?


With that out of the way - 4 to 8 of them in every security platoon? - with that out of the way then what do you require for an Assault Vehicle?
 

TangoTwoBravo

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Looking through existing Canadian doctrine (based on WW2 and also received lessons from the 1973 War), I find the following:

a. tanks lead in open country

b. dismounted infantry lead in close country

c. mounted infantry seldom lead

I don't think that much has fundamentally changed. If you lead with LAVs with sections on board you are going to get taken out by tanks and ATGMs. If you hang about in a crowded assembly area within artillery range you are going to get hit. This is true now and was true before. As Infanteer points out, against some threats you stay mounted and against others you dismount and disperse.

I think that infantry should be as generalist as possible. Having one unit of infantry for rear-area security and another for close combat is, to me, needless specialization. Our Kandahar experience, of course, was different. Over there, the soldiers in the convoy were a million times more important than the convoy itself. Having a trucker captured would have been a disaster of the greatest magnitude. So we dedicated organizations to convoy escort and force protection. Made sense in that context.

In general war the calculus changes. Artillery, CPs and logistical elements all must be ready to rely on their own means to defend themselves. People will be lost. Convoys will be ambushed. War is bad. There are situations, though, where it may well be appropriate to dedicate combat elements to rear area security. That decision should be based on the estimate of the situation with an emphasis on the threat. A company of infantry guarding the BSA is not doing something else. Opportunity cost.

Regarding UAS, as a young Armour Lieutenant in 1991 seeking overhead cover whenever halted was hammered into us due to the expected air threat (we were still in a Cold War mindset). UAS have certainly increased the chances of having vehicle groupings detected and hit along with a potential shortening of the loop from sensor to shooter, but the possibility existed before. CUAS and winning the artillery duel are important, but for the infantry platoon and company I think that the answer is to avoid bunching up, minimize time spent in assembly areas and get overhead cover when you do halt.

Anyhoo.
 

Kirkhill

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Looking through existing Canadian doctrine (based on WW2 and also received lessons from the 1973 War), I find the following:

a. tanks lead in open country

b. dismounted infantry lead in close country

c. mounted infantry seldom lead

I don't think that much has fundamentally changed. If you lead with LAVs with sections on board you are going to get taken out by tanks and ATGMs. If you hang about in a crowded assembly area within artillery range you are going to get hit. This is true now and was true before. As Infanteer points out, against some threats you stay mounted and against others you dismount and disperse.

Some things never change. For good reason.

I think that infantry should be as generalist as possible. Having one unit of infantry for rear-area security and another for close combat is, to me, needless specialization.

I also agree with that. I wasn't arguing for specialization. What I was suggesting was that some duties require a greater array of skills than others. Fighting tanks and laying guns requires greater skills than securing guns and tanks Ideally any CUAS system would require minimal skills so that the system could be managed by all trades. Conversely an Assault force of Infantry, I believe, requires a greater array of skils than infanteers securing BMAs, VPs and LOCs.

From there I make the suggestion that it might be possible to employ less accomplished soldiers in rear area security roles until they get "blooded" and learn to survive in their new environment and while they are picking up skills that will make them useful replacements for casualties in front line units.

I'm not thinking of having an Offensive Team, a Defensive Team and Specialist Teams. Far from it.

Our Kandahar experience, of course, was different. Over there, the soldiers in the convoy were a million times more important than the convoy itself. Having a trucker captured would have been a disaster of the greatest magnitude. So we dedicated organizations to convoy escort and force protection. Made sense in that context.

In general war the calculus changes. Artillery, CPs and logistical elements all must be ready to rely on their own means to defend themselves. People will be lost. Convoys will be ambushed. War is bad. There are situations, though, where it may well be appropriate to dedicate combat elements to rear area security. That decision should be based on the estimate of the situation with an emphasis on the threat. A company of infantry guarding the BSA is not doing something else. Opportunity cost.

I agree with you.

Regarding UAS, as a young Armour Lieutenant in 1991 seeking overhead cover whenever halted was hammered into us due to the expected air threat (we were still in a Cold War mindset). UAS have certainly increased the chances of having vehicle groupings detected and hit along with a potential shortening of the loop from sensor to shooter, but the possibility existed before. CUAS and winning the artillery duel are important, but for the infantry platoon and company I think that the answer is to avoid bunching up, minimize time spent in assembly areas and get overhead cover when you do halt.

Anyhoo.

And some things never change. For good reason.

But what happens when spacing moves from 5 m to 20 m because of PRRs? Or the effective range of the section increases to 800 m against all targets? But sections can see other sections moving 10 km away? And the battalion can see and strike at 40 km?

I agree entirely that some verities are timeless, as Infanteers DuPuy would have it. But I would suggest that in the eternal game of Rock-Paper-Scissors that the weighting of the elements is constantly changing. Somethings get easier and other things get harder.
 

Kirkhill

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... Or, I guess to put it another way, there may be nothing wrong with the doctrine, which would be a good thing, but the implementation of it in terms of equipment, tactics, training and procedures, that have to constantly shift. Often at the commander's whim?
 
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